In this work we frame within auction theory an index that allows to order di¤erent projects for the construction of onshore wind energy plants and that explicitly takes into account their environmental quality. Wind farm projects are de…ned as vectors of attributes, encompassed in four categories: the technical properties of each project; its social impact; its environmental impact and the share of earnings that proponents o¤er to the collectivity in compensation for the negative externalities of the wind plant. We de…ne an absolute index that allows to order di¤erent proposals and evaluate the acceptability of each project, providing the monetary value of each point and inducing a truthful revelation of …rms'private information. Moreover, we calibrate the index, on the basis of a representative project and derive the corresponding iso-scoring curves.
Introduction.
Wind power is one of the most important source of renewable energy.
1 It is generally widely accepted that the exploitation of onshore wind power sites can be e¢ ciently undertaken in a market setting; however, its development implies signi…cant market failures that justify the need of planning and regulation by the public authority. Indeed, there are relevant local negative environmental externalities that are associated with the visual and sound impact of onshore windmills and their possible negative interaction with local wildlife and other working activities.
2 From a theoretical point of view it is well known that a project is socially e¢ cient whenever the social bene…ts overtake social costs. Therefore, the public body in charge of authorizing the exploitation of wind power sites should approve a speci…c project only after an adequate evaluation of its net bene…ts and then, having internalized the externalities with the proper instruments, let the market choosing the characteristics of the investment project. However, in the real world, the investment decisions about the exploitation of onshore wind power are not easy. There are asymmetries of information about the precise location of the sites and the technologies that should be adopted, preemption moves by investors, shortsighted investment problems, local resistance by local communities that bear the cost of local externalities, imprecise or unclear selection rules. All these aspects are intercorrelated. Public approvals are often constrained by some minimal requirement, among which there is, generally, obtaining a positive judgment in the Environmental Impact Assessment. Unfortunately, such a procedure can only highlight those proposals that are insu¢ cient with respect to one or more speci…c aspects, but neglects to capture the interaction among all elements that characterize a speci…c project. A second relevant point that has to be taken into account when dealing with onshore wind power sites exploitation refers to the scarcity of resources. Indeed, even if the wind supply can be assumed to be a public good, that is not true for the land, which is a scarce and rival good. Therefore, in order to reach an e¢ cient allocation of the investments in wind power production in a given area the public authority has to decide the highest number of wind parks 1 In Europe at the end of 2007 there were 58,1 Gw of capacity installed, that covers roughly 4% of total electric demand. In the whole world, there where 94.1 Gw, with a growth rate of 27% (Dorn, 2008) .
2 For an analysis of visual impacts of o¤shore wind plants see Ladenburg and Dubgaard (2007) .
that should be realized in that area. Moreover, if the number of projects that aims to be developed is higher than their desired number (for instance, the amount of investments that maximize social welfare, or the number of wind turbines that can be physically implemented in that speci…c place), the public body has to call on some decision making criterion that allows to order and select the various rival proposals.
In the paper we show that this problem can be tackled by a speci…c tool, namely, a single scoring rule that measures the net bene…t associated to each project. A threshold of the scoring rule can be set in such a way to separate projects that have net positive social bene…ts from those whose costs exceed the bene…ts. Moreover, for those investment projects whose score is above the threshold, the rule allows to rank them according to their social welfare. Indeed, such a rule works as an (implicit) auction for the exploitation of onshore wind power sites. Afualo et al. (1998) have shown that auctions are widely used to allocate public resources since they allow to endeavour the auctioning public body with a positive revenue from the procedure and also because (if properly run) they can e¢ ciently allocate scarce resources. The scoring rule we propose works as a multidimensional auction, 3 that takes into account the various aspects that are related to the building and running of a wind park. The crucial element of the scoring rule is the de…nition of the scoring function, i.e., the algorithm that allows attaching a single numerical value to the vector of the elements that describe the project. Asker et al. (2008) and Dini et al. (2006) show that the scoring function enables to translate into …gures the impact that every element has on the social welfare. Therefore, for these types of auctions the score can be seen as a proxy of the net social welfare correlated to each speci…c project and it thus provides a (implicit) cost-bene…t assessment.
The paper proceeds as follows: in the next section we show the proposed scoring rule, analyzing it in the mark of the multidimensional auction theory; in the subsequent section we calibrate the index, showing an example of its possible implementation. References follow. The mathematics of the scoring rule is reported in the appendix.
The Scoring Rule for Selection of Wind
Power Projects.
Generally, when the public authority 4 runs a multidimensional auction it applies the "best economic o¤er"as the decisive decision criterion, attaching a score to each proposal according to the following summation:
where i is the weight attached to the element i, v ij (x i1 ; :::; x iN ) is a number (between 0 and 1) that refers to the evaluation of the i th element in the proposal j, and x i is the …gure that is proposed by the proponent about element i. There are two main ways to score the di¤erent proposals: a discretionary way, or a quantitatively pre-de…ned one. The formers requires the intervention of a speci…c committee that, given some subjective technical evaluation, decides how many points each o¤er is worth for that speci…c element of the proposal. The latter is based on some speci…c pre-de…ned algorithm, which can be absolute or relative. Under absolute scoring rule, the score received by the proposal j depends only on its own proposed …gure, and it is thus completely independent from the amount proposed by the other N j proposals, as it is for relative scoring rule. Thus for absolute scoring we have that:
Discretionary procedure are generally applied whenever there are some aspects that are too di¢ cult to be evaluated on the basis of quantitative judgments only, as it happens, for instance, for judgments about the aesthetic quality of a masterpiece, or the trust about some proponent. Obviously, these aspects undermine the transparency of any scoring rule, and thus they should not be the pivotals element of a multidimensional scoring rule. For this reason, in our scoring rule we adopt the discretionary method just for the assessment of a single parameter, namely, the local environmental impact of wind parks.
Automatic methods are generally implemented through relative scoring formulas. Indeed, even if they allow to calibrate the point received by each proposal as compared to the others, they may be ine¢ cient since do not provide the correct incentives to proponents (Dini et al. 2006) . Indeed, with relative scoring formulas, …rms cannot infer the preferences of the public authority and thus need to make inferences about them, which might lead to ine¢ cient proposals. Moreover, relative methods cannot allow evaluating the quality of the single proposal; this, in our case, would undermine the possibility of assessing the net social welfare of a proposed wind park in absolute terms. For these reasons, we adopt an absolute procedure in our scoring rule to attach points to the various elements considered. However, the adoption of absolute scoring rules requires an important caveat. Indeed, whenever the public body speci…es the points attached to the proposal it (implicitly) declares its willingness to pay (i.e., not to receive) in order to obtain an increase in the score, i.e., in the quality of the proposal (see Dini et al. 2006) . In other words, preferences of the public authority can be inferred by calculating the Economic Value of a Point (EV P ).
The EV P corresponds to the marginal increment of the o¤er that it is necessary in order to obtain one single points more. Clearly, this value is constant i¤ the scoring function that attaches the point …gure to that element is linear. Therefore, in order to evaluate the various elements of a proposal with an absolute scoring rule a minimum and a maximum threshold has to be set. The min equals the value of that speci…c element that obtains a null point, while the max corresponds to the value beyond which it is not possible to increase the score by increasing the o¤er on that element. The product of the weight attached to each aspect with the EV P assigned to the monetary o¤er de…nes the maximum amount that the public authority is willing to spend in order to receive a proposal that equals the max.
We evaluate the proposals of installing a wind park looking at four elements of the proposals: There are several reasons that justify the need to evaluate all these aspects. The meaning of N is rather obvious, since it aims at prizing those projects that implies lower negative local externalities. For the same reason, R expresses the amount of revenues that are given back to the local community; the idea is that this should (at least) reduce the opposition of local communities that underestimate the global bene…t and overestimate the (local) damages.
5 Similarly, S aims at prizing those projects that guarantee not only …nancial returns but also labour ones. 6 The technical impact E captures the "quality"of the investment, i.e., it emphasizes, ceteris paribus, those projects that can guarantee higher wind power for given wind supply (an thus maximize the production of positive global externalities).
The score we propose is the following:
It is quite complex to evaluate the environmental impact of a wind production plant, and it is not clear which proxy should be employed for it. Therefore, we prefer to leave the evaluation of N to a speci…c committee that should judge the proposals on the basis of a pre-de…ned grid of aspects, each of which is to be evaluated according to a given scale and then converted in a numerical score encompassed between null and 1. Call this v N . In order to de…ne the total score assigned to each proposal with respect to this element, we just have to decide the weight that such an aspect has in the scoring rule, namely, N .
The royalty o¤ered is generally expressed as a percentage of the expected income. In this way, both the public body and the …rm share the risk of 5 It is the well-known NIMBY behavior. For an analysis of the factors that in ‡uence local acceptance, see Jobert and Laborgne (2006) , Nadaï (2007) and references therein.
6 Recall that the land on which a wind plant is going to be set is a rival good. Other renewable sources that are less marginal such as biomass, for instance, may be preferred by public bodies since they need a higher share of labour in their production function w.r.t. wind plants. In other words, the scoring rule captures the idea that biomasses (may) guarantee a double dividend and that wind power plants should be compared to other alternatives w.r.t. this component of the social return of the investment. If this is not the case, simply set s = 0. the business, due to randomness of wind supply. However, the bene…ts for the local community do not depend on the expected revenue but on the (expost) realized ones. For this reason, in our formula v R is proportional to the product between the proposed royalty and the forecasted revenue described in the …nancial and economic plan that each proponent has to submit together with the proposal. Revenues are evaluated on the basis of the forecast of the wind supply, that allows calculating the amount of full load hours (the ratio between the energy produced by the considered wind farm and the nominal power of the same wind farm):
where r is the proposed royalty (% of the yearly revenue), Q are Mwh forecasted, and allows to convert the physical amount of energy in economic …gures.
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Q is thus the cash ‡ow that is estimated by the public authority, 8 and r Q is the estimated yearly compensation, expressed in euro. R min and R max are the minimum and the maximum compensation that are going to be accepted by the public body. O¤ers lower that R min receive zero points, while …rms cannot gain more than the maximum amount of point they can obtain by o¤ering a compensation higher than R max . Notice that v R 2 [0; 1]. The …gure of full load hours of a given wind farm is given by:
O i T i where m is the number of wind turbines that are to be installed in the project, O i is the amount of full load hours of each turbine that is estimated according to the wind forecast and T i is the nominal power of each turbine that has to be installed.
The average value of O i for a given wind park, namely, O, has been chosen as a proxy for the technical quality of the project. Indeed, its value depends both on the wind supply (which in turns depend on the chosen site) and on the quality of the turbine that the proposal has chosen. We set a score v E is a monotone function of O. Thus, our scoring rule prizes project that provide a higher amount of wind energy both directly through v E and 7 has to be set ex-ante and is common for all proposals. It can be set equal to the value of the green certi…cates for those areas where such an incentive scheme has been set, or it corresponds to the (common) energy price if no wind …rm has market power. 8 It is an estimate calculated by the public authority given the value of which corresponds to the theoretical value of the producible energy in each year. It is needed just to express royalties in percentage terms; thus, we do not consider the …nancial cost of the project.
indirectly through v R , since the higher the amount of equivalent-hours of a wind-mill the higher the revenues and thus the possible royalties on them. However, there is an important point that has to be underlined here. There is an asymmetry of information between the proponent of the wind farms and the public authorities since the information about wind supply of a speci…c site is a private one.
9 Therefore, there is an incentive for the enterprise to play strategically, increasing the estimate of O in order to increase the score that it can obtain. We use two tools 10 that allow us to reduce the possible distortion. The …rst one refers to the way the public authority calculates the compensation due. The idea is to link the amount due both to e¤ective revenues and to those that the enterprise would have gained had the wind plan e¤ectively worked the forecasted amount of hours. Formally:
Where R t is the amount of royalties that are to be paid in year t, Q E t is the amount of energy that is e¤ectively produced in year t, z is a prede…ned percentage set by the public body and 2 [0; 1]. In this way, the compensation that the enterprise will e¤ectively pay in each year is positively correlated both to Q (estimated energy) and to Q E t (energy e¤ectively produced). Therefore, there is a disincentive to strategically overestimate Q but at the same time the proponent does not bears entirely the full risk of possible mistakes in the estimates. 11 The second tool that we adopt to reduce the incentive to gaming, is the algorithm that captures the technical 9 Generally, it depends on the point-wise samples that a proponent has to take through speci…c on site studies that are generally run after some pre-contractual agreement between the …rms and the owners of the land.
10 A third possible mean is a reputational one. Indeed, one could track the di¤erences between the estimated …gures reported in the proposal and those that are measured ex-post and on the basis of the di¤erences between these one could assess a measure of trustworthiness of the proponent. Such a measure could be used to prize in future assessment those proponents that have proposed estimates that were closer to the realized ones. See Doni (2006) and Albano et al. (2008) for an explanation of the importance of reputational mechanism in procurement auctions. However, we prefer not to exploit this point here since we aim at de…ning a scoring rule whose validity is independent on the amount of times that it is used, also because exploitation of wind power site is generally not a repeated interaction setting. 11 We are implicitly assuming that providing a good estimate of the true wind power is a public good and for this reason the public body has to share the risk of estimate with the private …rm. In the appendix, we show how to calibrate taking into account the trade-o¤ between risk allocation and incentives for truth-telling. Consider, however, that the tool quality of the plant. We adopt a concave function that reduces the incentive to overestimate the full load hours, since the impact of a given increase in the full load hours on the score that can be obtained is decreasing:
where O is the average amount of full load hours of the wind plant. O min and O max are the minimum and the maximum amount of full load hours; y 2 ( 1; 1) is a parameter that expresses the concavity of the formula (the closer to 1, the more concave the formula, while for y that goes to 1 the formula becomes linear; see Appendix A.2). Again, notice that v E 2 [0; 1]:
Social impact is evaluated through an automatic method, where the proxy is the number of new employees hired in each wind farm for its use and maintenance:
where s is the number of full time employee and s max is the upper bound of s. Therefore, every new employee hired allows the proponent to increase her score by s smax . Clearly this parameter has to be calibrated in order to make it coherent with the EV P , that can be easily calculated by just deriving the increase in the expenditure that has to be paid in order to obtain an extra point. If we suppose that each new employee has a cost of , we can easily set the EV P associated with S, call it EV P S , as:
Similarly, for the EV P associated with revenues we have that:
Obviously, the parameters have to be calibrated so that EV P S = EV P R . Summing up, the scoring rule we propose to evaluate the di¤erent projects of wind power production farms is the following:
proposed is a viable one that does not derive from the solution of a possible interaction game set between the public authorizing body and the proposers.
3 The Calibration of the Scoring Rule.
It is natural to interpret the scoring rule in equation 10 as a social welfare function whose weighs are i ; i = fN; R; E; Sg : The public authority should assess the weights according to its preferences and set the value of the (exploitation) of the environment, i.e. N , through an appropriate evaluation method. 12 In that case, the calibration should be performed assessing values of R max and s max so that EV P S = EV P R and it assumes a plausible value (taking into account that a limited amount of workers can be hired in wind …rms). However, such a …rst best exercise is often overridden in the practise by the e¤ective needs of the public authority, that requires a calibration even without having carried trough any ex-ante evaluation exercise. Therefore, we calibrate the index I here taking into account a reference project, and choosing the weights and the threshold so that no single aspect is decisive, for otherwise we would undermine the possibility that the index considers the whole set of parameters that are relevant for the projects. Consider for instance R. We need to set v R so that even if the enterprise o¤ers the max of r it does not have the guarantee of being authorized unless it obtains positive scores in the o¤ers about the other parameters. Moreover, the weights have to be set so that they re ‡ect the importance that each component has in the public decision (i.e., welfare) function, were it is generally assumed that royalties is the most relevant component. For the threshold (even if the choice should be left to the public authority), it should be graduated according to the environmental quality of the land over which the investment projects are planned. For instance, in the new regulation for development of wind power set by the Italian Region Basilicata (GSE-Regione Basilicata, 2008) , the whole surface of the region has been classi…ed in four categories depending on the di¤erent environmental quality of the areas, and each of it has a di¤erent threshold associated.
13 From now onward, we will neglect this point and assume that there is a single threshold, set at 80% of the maximum possible score (100).
The following is a possible calibration: Consider the following investment project, made of 15 wind turbines of 2Mw each, in a site whose full load hours are 2100. With a price of green energy set at 180 euro per Mwh, the project has a yearly cash- ‡ow of 11; 340; 000 euro. From equations 8, 9, we can see that the EV P equals 15; 000 euro. Recall that the o¤er is made of four components: S, N , R and O. Suppose that there is no strategic behavior, i.e., O is truthfully reported.
14 It is easy to calculate the points that the project obtains from the technical parameter:
E v E = 15. By …xing one of the other parameter, we can show the trade o¤ between the other two. From now onward, we will …x the o¤er on S and show the correlation between R and the score that has to be obtained in the environmental component N in order to be authorized, i.e., to get a score higher than 80. Assume that the proponents are wiling to hire four workers. We have that S v S = 8. Therefore, the proposal has to obtain 57 points from N and R. If it obtains 25 points on N , it must obtain 32 points on R, which corresponds to an o¤er of 480; 000 euro, i.e., a share of 4; 23% of the revenues. Clearly, r is negatively correlated to N v N , for given S v S . If N v N = 17, it must o¤er an r = 5:29% (that equals R max ) to obtain 40 points. Obviously, the need to obtain points and thus increase o¤ers on R or on N is reduced if it obtains more points on S. Notice, however, that the highest score it can obtain from o¤ers on S is 10, and thus, even if it acquires 40 points on R it still has to obtain a score of 15 from the environmental evaluation in order to be authorized, which con…rms that the scoring rule proposed can induce a higher quality preservation of the local environment, i.e., a lower production of negative local externalities. The same is true for increases in O, which shows that the scoring rule is able to select best projects w.r.t. the quality of the site (in terms of full load hours) too.
With the …gures and the limits set above it is easy to de…ne the equation that de…nes the indi¤erence curve of the scoring rule (the iso-scoring curve): 65 2s = N v N + 756r, where o¤ers are constrained not to be bigger than the level that gives the highest score per each parameter. In …gure 1 we show the plot of the …ve equations that correspond each one to a di¤erent level of s = f1; 2; 3; 4; 5g that allow the proponent to obtain the threshold level of points, namely, 80 points:
[…gure 1 about here] We can see that the constraints are such that it is impossible to obtain more that 30 point from the environmental parameter and that a minimum level of 15 has still to be attained even if the proponent is willing to hire the maximum number of workers and paying the highest royalties (in our example 5,265% is the level of royalties that gives 40 points). Similarly, a royalty equal to 347,004 euro, i,e, 3.306% of the cash ‡ow, is the minimum level of royalty that the proponent has to o¤er even if it acquires 30 points form the environmental component and 10 from the social one in order to reach the threshold level. Finally, see that, as expected, both royalties and the environmental evaluation are decreasing as s rises. See that if = 1=2, we can induce the enterprise to truthfully reveal the percentage of revenues that it is willing to pay. This is the …rst best solution, since it induces the …rm to o¤er an amount of energy that can be produced that coincide with its estimated. However, such a solution depends on the possibility of knowing ex-ante the willingness to pay of the enterprise, since Q = Q if z = r when = 1=2. If the willingness to pay is ex-ante unknown, the public body has to make inferences about it. If it chose a level of z that is too low (high), the proponent has an incentive to increase (reduce) Q with respect to the true one and this implies that should be lowered (increased). In this way the level of Q that is proposed is closer to the estimated one; this however increases (reduces) the burden of the estimation risk borne by the enterprise since the true amount that ex post the …rm is going to pay depends more (less) on the estimated energy than the produced one. 
